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Comments and Observations on Res
Judicata and Patent Law
Ronald P. Kananen
In view of the protracted and highly technical nature of patent liti-
gation, Mr. Kananen suggests that an appreciable saving of judicidal time
could be effectuated by increased application of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel to patent disputes. The author briefly delineates the ration-
ale for these doctrines and then points out that their effect on the body
of patent law has been clarified to some extent in ex parte prosecution
before the Patent Office. After discussing existing approaches to the
use of res judicata in patent litigation, the author asserts that a more
rigorous implementation of the doctrine should parallel its antecedent
development in the areas of non-patent law.
A RECUR.1NG PROBLEM' in the prosecution2 and enforce-
mente of a patent is the application of the judicial doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel to correlative aspects of patent
law.4 These doctrines do not appear to have achieved their full poten-
tial in patent cases as they gen-
erally have achieved in non-THm AUTH-OR (B.S.:RE., Case Institute patent disputes5 with the con-
of Technology, J.D., Western Reserve
University) is a practicing attorney in comitant result of reducing
Cleveland, Ohio, and a member of the protracted and repetitive litiga-
American and the Ohio State Bar Assod-
ations. He is also a member of the tion. In general, the courts
American and the Cleveland Patent Law seemingly have hesitated to ex-
Associations. tend the principles of res judi-
cata in patent cases to the de-
gree that res judicata has found favor in other areas of law. The
' See C. M. Wright, U.S. Patent System and the Judiciary, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y
727 (1965). See also Conference, Washington, D.C, March 1, 1965, The U.S.
Patent System 1790-1965 A Look to the Future, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Sod'Y 211 (1965).
In C. A. Wright, The Federal Courts - a Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742,
745 (1966), Professor Wright has characterized the problem as "another of the prices
of the circuit system as we know it."
2 Prosecution of a patent refers to the activities directed toward obtaining the grant
of a patent from the Patent Office. These activities include ex parte practice before
the Office, as well as inter partes proceedings in the event of interference. See Note,
The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Ex Parte Patent Practice - Prototype for a Liberal
Approach, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 716 (1956), reprinted at 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 220
(1957).
3 Enforcement of the patent pertains to actions available to the patentee after the
grant of the patent which are directed toward relief from infringement of the claims
of the patent. See C. M. Wright, supra note 1.
4See generally 3 WALKER, PATENTs § 684 (Deller ed. 1937); 3 ROBINSON,
PATENTs 184-86 (1890); TOuLMn, PATENTS 493-94 (2d ed. 1954).
5 C. M. Wright, supra note 1.
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result is that the effect of a prior adjudication in patent law is doubt-
ful and has somewhat varying application.' On the other hand, it
appears that the Patent Office, as the administrative body respon-
sible for the examination and issuance of patents to inventors, more
clearly applies the doctrine during the prosecution of an application
for a patent,' with certain exceptions!
It is the purpose of this presentation, first, to outline the
development of the applicability of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel as well as the rules of mutuality in non-patent cases and to ob-
serve the general applications of the doctrines;' next, to relate the
rules of res judicata in ex parte prosecution of patents in the Patent
Office;1" then to observe the application of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in particular instances of patent enforcement in an at-
tempt to formulate various approaches with respect to the effect
which should be given a prior adjudication;" and, finally, to suggest
guideposts of reason which may be followed in the application of
these doctrines to the developing body of patent law."2
L BACKGROUND
The doctrine of res judicata' 8 and its variants has evolved from
concepts which seek to provide the element of finality to judicial
6 See text accompanying notes 147-212 infra.
7 See, e.g., Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177 F.2d 583 (2d Cit.
1949); Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Application of
Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Application of Fried, 312 F.2d 930 (C.C.P.A.
1963).
8 See text accompanying notes 51-99 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 13-50 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 51-99 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 100-212 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 213-19 infra.
1 For a general discussion of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the effect of
prior judgments, see 1B MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 5 0.401-.448 (2d ed. 1965);
Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE LJ. 339 (1948); Vestal, The Constitu-
tion and Preclusion/Res Iudicata, 62 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1963); Vestal, Preclusion!
Res Iudicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REv. 27 (1964); Vestal, Rationale of Pre-
clusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29 (1964); Developments in the Law - Res iudicata, 65
HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952).
The term res judicata has been used to describe two essentially different
rules which should be distinguished. First, final determination of any liti-
gation precludes a new suit on the same "cause of action." If the plaintiff
won the prior action, all claims which he may subsequently raise "merge" in
the judgment obtained, and any further action must be based on that judg-
ment; if he lost, he is "barred" from suing anew on the same cause of action.
Comment, Res Jndicata in California, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 412, 413 (1952).
(Footnote omitted.)
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determinations and an end to litigation between parties. 4 In its
simplest form, a final judgment on the merits of a particular
cause of action precludes further litigation of the same cause of
action between the same parties or between parties who are, in a
legal sense, in privity with the litigants.'" Thus, where the causes
of action or the parties are different, the subsequent litigation is not
generally bound by the results of the prior adjudication. Where
parties to a later suit are not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata
from litigating matters not previously judged to be binding,
collateral estoppel' 6 may apply, even though the issues in the
latter suit could have been earlier presented." Thus, collateral
estoppel recognizes the conclusiveness of the judgment of the prior
action" where the subsequent litigation is on a different cause of
action.19
A. Res Judicata
Under the concept of res judicata, a valid, final, and prior ad-
judication rendered on the merits of a cause of action bars relitiga-
tion by parties or their privies of issues which were raised, or could
have been raised, before the court rendering the prior judgment."
The rationale for the existence and utilization of the doctrine' rests
upon the concepts that (1) litigation should have an end, as well as
a beginning;2 (2) judicial time should be conserved to the extent
14 1B MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0A05 11], at 621.
15 Ibid.
16BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY 327, 650 (4th ed. 1951). "[I]f a suit, though based
on a differing cause of action, involves 'issues' previously litigated in another suit, res
judicata will prevent raising such issues again. This aspect of the doctrine is known as
'collateral estoppel."' Comment supra note 13.
17See lB MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 55 0.40513], 0.44111].
181d. 5 0A0511].
19 Various rules for determining whether the second action is foreclosed have
been suggested. Among the most common are that the causes of action are
the same if: (a) the same principles of substantive and procedural law are
applicable to both actions, (b) the same right is alleged to be infringed by
the same wrong in both actions, (c) the judgment sought in the second action
would infringe rights established in the first, (d) the same evidence would
support both actions, or (e) the operative facts are the same in both actions.
Developments, supra note 13, at 824-25. (Foomotes omitted.)
20 See generally Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Lawlor v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948);
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); lB MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13,
5 0.405.
2 1 Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra note 20, at 597.
22 StoU v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
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that justice to the parties permits; 23 and (3) public policy favors the
establishment of certainty in legal relations.24 Moreover, the res
judicata effect of the prior determination is binding between parties
or their privies to the prior adjudication, notwithstanding the possi-
bility that all available grounds for recovery were not asserted by
the plaintiff or that all potential defenses were not urged by the
defendant.25
A judgment, however, may, in the proper case, be vacated or
amended by direct or collateral attack, 6 thus providing the litigating
parties with an additional measure of protection from unconscion-
able application of the general rule of res judicata. In the federal
courts, a judgment, once entered,2" may be reopened by a motion
for a new trial,2" altered or amended by a motion to alter or amend
the judgment," or relieved from the unjust effects of a final judg-
ment on numerous other grounds. 30
Furthermore, considerations of public policy may operate to
mitigate or obviate applications of the doctrine. 1 In these in-
stances, the policies favoring use of the doctrine 2 are balanced
against the policies which would be abraded by general application
of res judicata, without considering the reasoning which has prompted
the enunciation of the conflicting policies.33  The source of reasons
which may ultimately conflict with the rationale urging res judicata
may be found inter alia in the policies of Congress, 4 of the courts,3 5
and of the public, for example, against monopoly or restraint of
trade.36
B. Collateral Estoppel
When the cause of action in a subsequent litigation between the
mCommissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). See also C. M. Wright,
supra note 1, at 728; cf. C. A. Wright, supra note 1.
24 Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra note 23.
25 1B MOoRE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.405[1], at 622.
26 See generally id. 55 0.405[1], [4.-11.
2 7 FED. R. Cirv. P. 58.
2
8FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)-(d).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
31 1B MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, g 0A05[111.
32 See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
33See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
34 Accord, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
35 E.g., judicial restraint and the hesitancy on the part of courts to enter into areas
which may be legislative in nature.
36See Mercoid Corp. v Mid-Continent I v. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1944).
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same parties or their privies differs from the cause of action which
prompted the prior adjudication, the prior judgment prevents the
parties from litigating the issues that were actually litigated."7 The
rights, questions, or facts determined in the first instance are taken
as conclusively established by the prior judgment,8 "so long as the
judgment in the first suit remains unmodified."39
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen4 ° has stated the
proposition as follows:
[Where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata is applied
much more narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have
been litigated and determined, but "only as to those matters in is-
sue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or verdict was rendered. ' '4 1
It is sufficient only to note that the comments concerning judg-
ments ' and the need to weigh other policy considerations against
the reasons for mechanically applying the doctrine of res judicata 3
are also applicable to the principles of collateral estoppel.
The differentiation between res judicata and collateral estoppel
made in connection with the preclusive effect of a prior judgment
as between the same parties ... is not easy to maintain in cases in
which the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is asserted by or
against persons not parties to the prior action. In some sense of
the term "cause of action," any claim asserted against a person not
a party to the prior action is a "different" cause of action from the
one asserted in the prior action. But ... the preclusive effect of a
prior adjudication in respect of persons previously not parties ex-
tends in some situations not only to preclusion of relitigation of
matters "actually and necessarily determined" (the collateral estop-
pel formula), but also to matters which "might have been liti-
gated" (the res judicata formula).44
a7See cases cited note 20 supra.
8 See, e.g., Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
39M. at 49. See also text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
40 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
41Id. at 597-98 (quoting from the 1876 case of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 353). See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 671
(1944); RESTATEMEN, JUDGMENTS §§ 68-70 (1942) (cited by the Court in Sun-
non). Cf. Old Grantian Co. v. William Grant & Sons, Ltd., 150 U.S.P.Q. 58 (C.C.P.A.
1966).
42 See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
43 lB MOO E, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.405[11], at 784. See text accompanying
notes 31-36 supra.
4 4
LouIsELL & HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PRocEDuRa 586-87 (1962).
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C. The Rule of Mutuality for Asserting the Prior Adjudication
The doctrine of mutuality is based on the concept that a party to
a subsequent suit who attempts to utilize the preclusive res judicata
or collateral estoppel effects of a prior adjudication must have been
bound by the prior judgment if the outcome of the prior suit had
been opposite.45 The general formulation of the doctrine of mu-
tuality essentially requires that, as a condition for invoking the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, one must have been a party or a privy to
the prior suit.4"
The fundamental notion which underlies the general require-
ment of mutuality, derived from constitutional considerations of due
process, dictates that a party is entitled to his day in court and should
not be bound by an adjudication which he did not control and in
which he was not a party, was not represented, and was not given
the opportunity to be heard.47
However, the doctrine of mutuality has been the subject of
criticism." Where the mutuality requirements have been relaxed to
apply collateral estoppel, courts have considered that if the issues
presented in both the prior and subsequent litigation were the
same, a party against whom the prior judgment was rendered should
be bound by the prior determination, regardless of the legal char-
acter of the opposing party in the later litigation.49 Thus, a
stranger to the prior suit may defensively assert the prior adjudica-
tion against a party to the prior suit."0
45 See generally lB MoORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.412; Bigelow v. Old Domin-
ion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912). See also RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS 5 93(b) (1942).
46 1B MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.412.
4 7 LOUISELL & HAzARD, op. cit. supra note 44, at 587.
48 See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942) (the leading case attacking the logic of the mutuality rule). For a
collection of cases on the topic, see Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53
CALIF. L. REv. 25, 38-46 (1965). See generally Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estop-
pel: Limits on the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). Cf. Polasky,
Collateral Estoppel - Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. RE v. 217 (1954); De-
velopments, supra note 13.
Professor Moore minimizes the effect of the criticisms and advocates retention of the
rule in its general form. 1B MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.412; Moore & Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961).
49 "No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of
mutuality ...." Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, supra note 48,
at 812, 122 P.2d at 895. The court in Bernhard considered only three tests to be per-
tinent: "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudica-
tion?" Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. (Emphasis added.)
50 lB MOORE, op. cit. supra note 13, 5 0.412[1], at 1808-11.
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With these fundamental notions of res judicata in mind, atten-
tion will now be directed towards the applicability of these concepts
to situations which occur in ex parte proseution of patent appli-
cations in the Patent Office and to certain aspects of litigation
to enforce rights contained within the patent.
II. RES JUDICATA IN Ex PARTE
PATENT OFFICE PROCEEDINGS
The applicability of res judicata to ex parte proceedings in the
United States Patent Office has attained a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty as a result of several recent pronouncements from the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) 5 and certain guidelines issued
by the Patent Office itself which appear in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP)." The CCPA has approvingly
cited5" these guidelines, which would appear to promote increased
uniformity in these previously confused areas of patent prosecution.
Both the CCPA and the Patent Office have been influenced by
certain matters of policy in sparingly applying the doctrine. For an
applicant whose claims have received a final rejection by the Patent
Office and who wishes to continue with his attempts to secure a pat-
ent, there are two alternative methods which are currently available
for continuing the application." He may appeal the final rejection
of the examiner to the Patent Office Board of Appeals,55 or he may
file a second application.56 If he chooses the latter course of action, a
51 See Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Application of
Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Application of Fried, 312 F.2d 930 (C.C.P.A.
1963). For a recent district court decision in the District of Columbia, see Kollsman
v. I.add, 226 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1964).
5 2 US. MANUAL OF PATmEr EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03 (w) (3d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as MPEP] provides in part:
A prior adjudication against the inventor on the same or similar claims
constitutes a proper ground of rejection as res judicata. Where a different
question of patentability is presented the rejection of res judicata does not
apply.
The rejection should only be used when the earlier decision was a final,
appellate one, such as a Board of Appeals decision where the time limit for
further remedies has expired, or a decision by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. But see 201.11, last paragraph, for a special situation.
53See Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 83-84 (C.C.P.A. 1965); Applica-
tion of Fried, 312 F.2d 930 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
54 See MPEP § 706.03(w). See also MPEP § 201.11. These sections provide
a "special section" discussed in text accompanying notes 74-81 infra.
5535 U.S.C. 5 134 (1964). See also Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R.
5 1.191-.198 (1960).
50 See PEP 5§ 201.07 (continuation), 201.11 (continuation-in-part). Cf. Appli-
cation of Fried, 312 F.2d 930, 934 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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dearer framing of the issues may result for both reconsideration and
subsequent appeal, if necessary."r This second application may serve
to correct errors and misunderstandings on the part of both the Pat-
ent Office and the inventor. The CCPA has commented that "often,
the filing of a continuation or a continuation-in-part results in a
fresh approach to and an effective reconsideration of the same
issues.""8
Patent Office policy on the issue of res judicata is reflected in the
conditions which must be met before the doctrine applies. The
conditions required are that the claim presented in the second ap-
plication must either be the same or similar to the claim presented
in the initial application, and must have been rejected on the same
question of patentability, the rejection having been affirmed by the
Patent Office Board of Appeals or an "appellate tribunal." 9
The CCPA has cited with approval the policy considerations for
the applicability of res judicata by the Patent Office and has con-
sidered it preferable that the expenditure of time be at the adminis-
trative rather than at the judicial level "especially where so much of
the procedural machinery of the Patent Office is designed to permit
just such a remedy."6 A forced appeal on unclear or inadequately
formed issues is detrimental to the interests of both the applicant and
the Patent Office.
While uniformity in the applicability of res judicata in ex parte
practice now appears to some extent, uniformity was not always
the practice."1 In Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co.,
62
the same claim which had been earlier rejected by an examiner was
subsequently allowed in a divisional application. In a later infringe-
ment suit, the Supreme Court considered that the Patent Office had
"waived" any objection to the claim63 and that res judicata as to
final objections was at the "option" of the Patent Office. 4
57 A method for classifying the issues may assume increased significance under the
new procedure of "compact prosecution." For an introduction to "compact prosecu-
tion" see Address by Commissioner Brenner, June 8, 1964, in 803 O.G. Pat. Off. 893
(June 23, 1964); Address by Commissioner Brenner, Jan. 25, 1965, in 811 O.G. Pat.
Off. 299 (Feb. 9, 1965); Address by Assistant Commissioner Wahl, Sept. 24, 1965,
in 819 O.G. Pat. Off. 893 (Oct. 19, 1965).
58 Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 85 (C.C.P.A. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
The court continued: "In many ways, application of res judicata is at variance with
the entire concept of continuing applications." Ibid.
59 See MPEP § 706.03 (w).
60 Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 85 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
61 See 33 GEo. WASH. L. Rtv. 1149 (1965).
0 274 U.S. 417 (1927).
63 Id. at 422.
,4 Id. at 421.
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The CCPA, however, did not appear to trust the notion of
"option" accorded the Patent Office on the basis of the first65 of
three recent decisions involving res judicata in ex parte practice. 6
The court preferred to distinguish Overland on the ground that the
"same claim" had been presented, inferring that the "option" was
not applicable where "different claims" were presented. However,
the CCPA affirmatively utilized the Overland case in approving the
prohibition in the MPEP against applying res judicata to unappealed
final rejections.6" The court reasoned that the Patent Office deci-
sions did not reflect a uniform policy in applying res judicata. The
court agreed that an unappealed final rejection in the Patent Office
was not res judicata and indicated that this should be the uniform
policy.
68
It is interesting to note that the Commissioner of Patents sought
rehearing in Application of Hitchings," requesting that "the court
modify its decision to the extent of holding that the Board properly
applied the policy with respect to res judicata to the facts of this
case, in accordance with the Commissioner's Manual directive .... .""
The brief for the Commissioner urged that the Patent Office had
adopted a uniform policy as set forth in sections 201.11 and
706.03 (w) ,71 which had consistently been enforced by Patent Of-
fice tribunals. After discussion of these decisions, 72 the brief stated:
"It is readily apparent that the Patent Office has applied res judicata
of unappealed final rejections only when such rejections were made
under Manual Section 201.11.,73
65 Application of Fried, 312 F.2d 930, 933 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
66 CCPA cases cited note 51 supra.
67 Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80, 82-85 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
68 See 33 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1149 (1965). In its holding, the court drew support
from DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 563-613 (1951) wherein res judicata in
the administrative setting is discussed.
69 342 F.2d 80 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
70 Brief for Commissioner on Petition for Rehearing, p. 8, Application of Hitch-
ings, supra note 69. (Emphasis added.) While the brief does not appear to take issue
with the holding of the court, it is not seen how the court could "modify" its decision
without reversing itself.
71 MPEP §§ 201.11, 706.03(w).
72 An analysis of the cases cited by the court in Hitchings tends to show a non-uni-
form policy by the Board. The brief argued, however, that, in fact, there was a uni-
form policy but that the court had failed to distinguish between two separate lines of
cases. These two separate lines of cases allegedly conform to MPEP §§ 201.11, 706.03
(w). The reasoning and cases are set forth in 33 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1149, 1150
(1965).
73 Brief for Commissioner, sfupra note 70, at 6. (Emphasis added.) It is suggested
that the brief errs in this statement in that it does not reflect the true meaning of MPEP
§ 201.11. See text accompanying notes 76-81 infra.
1966]
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The latter statement points out an area of confusion in the
applicability of res judicata. While section 706.03(w) of the
MPEP74 urges that a final rejection by an examiner is not res
judicata, which the brief for the Commissioner has confirmed as a
matter of Patent Office policy, this section does go on to state that
section 201.11 of the MPEP contains a "special situation." The
choice of terminology is indeed unfortunate because it infers that
section 201.11 embodies a special situation concerning res judicata.
But such is not the case. An examination of the section discloses
that it deals expressly with the concept of continuity between filing
dates75 and not with res judicata.
Section 201.11 may be elaborated upon, as it provides that cer-
tain conditions must be met before the benefit of an earlier filing
date may be obtained. The second application "must be an applica-
tion for a patent for an invention which is also disclosed in the first
application,"7 and the disclosure of the invention must be in terms
that comply with the requirements of the first paragraph of section
112 of the Patent Act. Section 201.11 of the MPEP concludes
with the following prohibition:
Where the first application is found to be fatally defective be-
cause of insufficient disclosure to support allowable claims, a sec-
ond application filed as a "continuation-in-part" of the first appli-
cation to supply the deficiency is not entitled to the benefit of the
filing date of the first application . . . . These cases also involve
the question of res judicata.78
74 MPEP 5 706.03 (w) quoted supra note 52.
7535 U.S.C. § 120 (1964).
76 MPEP § 201.11. (Emphasis added.)
7 7 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964) provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carry-
ing out his invention.
This section sets forth what is commonly referred to as the "how to use" requirement.
See Application of Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960). The second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964) states: "The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention."
This embodies the statutory basis for rejection of claims on such grounds as in-
definiteness, multiplicity, prolixity, inaccurateness, incompleteness, and undue breadth
in claiming the invention. See MCCRADY, PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE 5§ 76-79, 84,
93-95 (4th ed. 1959). See also MPEP § 706.03.
It is thus apparent that, in determining whether the "issue" has previously been
litigated, the precise ground of rejection and its statutory basis should be known.
78 The cases referred to are Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177
F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1949) and Buc, 114 U.S.P.Q. 552 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1957).
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The condition set forth in section 201.11 of the MPEP merely
expresses that which is necessary under section 120 of the act, 9
namely, that the applications must comply with the requirements of
section 112 of the act in order to secure the earlier filing date.
However, the invention, i.e., the subject matter sought to be patented
in the second application, may be sufficiently disclosed in the first
application to satisfy the requirements of section 112, notwithstand-
ing that the invention defined in the earlier claims failed to satisfy
section 112 in the original disclosure.
The inquiry under section 120 proceeds from what subject
matter is claimed in the second application to ascertain whether
the first application contains disclosure for that subject matter suf-
ficient to comply with section 112. The prohibition in section
201.11 of the MPEP merely provides that when the first application
contains insufficient disclosure (section 112) to support any allow-
able claims, the second application cannot "supply the deficiency,"
i.e., add new matter, so as to entitle the applicant to the benefit of the
filing date of the first application.8" Thus, the prohibition in MPEP
section 201.11 is directed to preventing the addition of new matter
to supply the deficiency in those cases where the earlier filing date
is sought. The section has nothing whatsoever to do with res
judicata.
Thus, it is submitted that there is no "special situation" which
somehow eliminates proof of the elements of res judicata when
questions under section 201.11 arise. When the section is consid-
ered in its proper context, realizing that it deals with continuity
between filing dates, its function becomes dear. It reflects
the provisions of the Patent Act in that the benefit of an earlier
filing date under section 120 of the act depends on the conditions
specified in section 112 of the act. Matter introduced for the first
time in the second application is not entitled to an earlier filing
date.8 1
A question arises as to whether an applicant may place
claims in the second application which have been held to be rejected
because of insufficient disclosure and thereafter seek a determination
as to whether those claims are entitled to the benefits of the earlier
filing date. Where new matter has been added to overcome the
alleged deficiency in the original application, an objection is proper
79 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1964).
so Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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against the addition of new matter to supply the sufficiency."
Thereafter, the applicant is not entitled to the earlier filing date.
However, the applicant is entitled to a determination concerning this
new issue, it being different from the previous issue which involved
the sufficiency of the disclosure.8"
Where no new matter has been added with respect to the same
claims presented earlier, no question involving section 201.11 of the
MPEP is raised.8" The question in the latter-framed situation in-
volves section 706.03(w). 5 Since the applicant has previously had
a determination on the issue of the sufficiency of the disclosure of
the application concerning the same claims, res judicata would
apply.8 6
Of course, the situation may become much more complicated.
For example, different claims and new matter may be presented
concurrently, or the claims in the first application may have been
presented by amendment and rejected as defining new matter. In
every instance, the issues determined by the prior rejection must be
ascertained so as to determine whether or not res judicata applies.
Two other troublesome areas concerning the applicability of res
judicata in ex parte prosecution are also illustrated in section
706.03(w) of the MPEP: (1) The manner in which it may be deter-
mined whether claims qualify as being "similar"; and (2) whether
the "issue" or "question of patentability" has been previously de-
cided.
The CCPA stated, as to the first area, that the inventions defined
by the claims must be compared,8" dearly meaning that the subject
matter defined by the claims must be compared, and "if the differ-
8 2 See text accompanying notes 79-81 sapra.
83 The issue in the second application may be whether, in fact, new matter has been
added. The applicant may argue that the matter added is inherent to the matter orig-
inally disclosed. Thus, it is dear that the issue may not have been litigated.
84 If the second application satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964) as to the invention
claimed in the second application without relying on subject matter not disclosed in
the original application, MPEP § 201.11 is satisfied.
85 MPEP 706.03 (w).
86 A prior decision by an appellate tribunal has been assumed. There appears to
be no explanation in the MPEP or in reported decisions explaining how MPEP § 201.11
involves res judicata or, even assuming that the same claims are presented in the same
application as a refiled, or substitute application and that the issues arise under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1964) (first paragraph), why an unappealed final rejection of an examiner is
res judicata in this class of cases only. It is submitted that the confusion lies in the
failure to consider the separate and non-overlapping roles of MPEP § 201.11 and §
706.03 (w).
87Application of Lundberg, 280 F.2d 865 (C.C.P.A. 1960). See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1964) (second paragraph) quoted supra note 77.
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ence is one which would not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art, the prior adjudication is certainly not a ground for rejec-
tion.
The comparison of claims, however, does not totally resolve
the issues of the applicability of res judicata. Rather, the same ques-
tion of patentability or issue must appear, and the claims must be
considered in this context. If, in this area, there is the confusion
that has been evidenced in case law terminology, it is submitted that
clarity and uniformity would be promoted if the rejection specified
the precise statutory grounds of rejection." Even if the same statu-
tory ground of rejection is relied upon in the second application, for
example, section 112 of the act,"0 the issue as to different or even
the same claims may not have been previously litigated. 1
The above problem has been evidenced most often in recent
cases under sections 120 and 112 of the act." The original claims
may well fail to teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to use
the invention (subject matter) defined by those claims.9" Or the
claims may not particularly point out and distinctly claim subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 4 In either
event, broader or narrower claims may well cure the defect. 5 It is
S8 Application of Lundberg, supra note 87, at 867. (Emphasis added.)
89 The CCPA continually urges the Patent Office to specify the precise statutory
ground of rejection, to the extent of remanding where the record is particularly confus-
ing in light of the commands of 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1964). In re Jepson, 148 U.S.P.Q.
736 (C.C.P.A. 1966). See also Application of Herrick, 344 F.2d 713 (CCC.P.A. 1965).
90 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
91 See note 77 supra for the brief sampling of nomenclature utilized by patent
lawyers for describing the basis for the rejection. The Patent Bar would provide itself
and the patent system a needed service by communicating in the terms of the 1952
Patent Act when discussing the grounds of rejection.
92 See cases cited note 51 supra. In particular, Application of Hitchings, 342 F.2d
80 (C.C.PA. 1965) is an excellent example of how not to state the rejection. The re-
quirement of "utility," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964), should be kept separate from the re-
quirement of "how to use" the invention, 35 U.S.C § 112 (1964). The invention de-
fined by the claims may well possess "utility," but the specification may fail to teach
one of ordinary skill in the art how to use the invention. See Application of Nelson,
280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
93 35 U.S.C § 112 (1964).
94 Ibid.
95 The problem is one of determining the precise ground of rejection alleged in
light of the statutory classes of invention. In the chemical arts, the breadth of the
claims is given closer scrutiny than in the mechanical arts. See McCRADY, op. cit.
supra note 77, §§ 94-95. See also MPEP § 706.03(n) (2). Moreover, more disclo-
sure may be required in mechanical cases to support very specific claims. It may be
unfair to the applicant to assert that an "insufficient disclosure" rejection, affirmed on
appeal, is res judicata to all possible claims. However, this appears to be the position
of the Patent Office. It is submitted that one must determine the "issue" litigated and
that the test of "same question of patentability" is too broad.
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apparent that the issue presented is dependent upon the claims,
and little guidance in the application of res judicata is obtained by
ascertaining the scope of the restrictive claims despite comment to
that effect in some decisions.96
A question often arises as to whether a rejection under the same
statutory grounds presents the same issue. Assuming that no new
matter has been presented in the second application, a decision
affirming the examiner's rejection based on section 101 of the act97
that the application lacks the prerequisite utility presents the same
issue despite differences in the subject matter defined by the claims."
Also, subject matter previously held obvious in view of the prior art
may not be relitigated on grounds of res judicata. 9  However,
there is no substitute manner for determining precisely the identity
of the issues previously litigated. It is the inquiry into these pre-
cise issues which provides the proof of the absence or presence of
one of the essential elements of res judicata.
It is encouraging to note the trend of decisions and policies by
both the Patent Office and the CCPA in the area of the applica-
bility of res judicata. To this end, a degree of stability has been
added to ex parte practice. It may be expected that the tools pro-
vided for consideration of the applicability of res judicata in these
areas will assist in promoting a just result for both the applicant
and the Patent Office.
III. PATENT LITIGATION AND RES JUDICATA
Under the 1952 Patent Act,' a patentee may enforce his
patent... by a civil action for infringemento against alleged in-
96 See Application of Fried, 312 F.2d 930, 932 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1963). The accu-
racy of this footnote in the court's opinion is questioned in 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1149, 1151 n.26 (1963).
9735 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
98 The effect of a "modification" of the law is discussed in Application of Szwarc,
319 F.2d 285, 286 (C.C.P.A. 1963), concerning the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1964).
9 9 See Application of Lundberg, 280 F.2d 865, 867 (C.C.P.A. 1960), where the
CCPA applied res judicata to issues arising under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964). The ex-
tent to which a litigant may present different claims in a second application in an at-
tempt to distinguish over the prior art and new evidence where the rejection is based
on § 103 of the act will undoubtedly provoke future comment. Compare Walter M.
Budde, Jr., 150 U.S.P.Q. 469 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1966) (considered by twelve members
of the Patent Office Board of Appeals), with Schott, 136 U.S.P.Q. 383 (Pat. Off.
Bd. App. 1962) (evidence of new "utility" distinguished claims over prior art).
100 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
10135 U.S.C. §§ 281-293 (1964).
10235 U.S.C. § 281 (1964).
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fringers who would trespass the claimed property rights,' and may
also recover damages0 . or obtain injunctive relief. 5 However, this
litigation is an extremely costly and lengthy matter' which, be-
cause of the technology necessarily involved in the enforcement of
the patent,"' becomes extraordinarily time-consuming for the fed-
eral courts. It is not uncommon for patent litigation to traverse a
span of years, and instances are known in which the trial of a single
patent case has persisted in excess of a year. Thus, it is dear that
the time element in patent litigation presents particular problems
to the federal courts.
Under the present circuit court system' and under the present
application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
to patent cases,0 9 the patentee may relitigate his patent in the
same"0 or different circuits"' as long as the defendants are differ-
ent, even though a particular court may hold his patent invalid.
In a typical suit for infringement or injunction, the patentee
103 The intellectual property right for which the patentee seeks protection is defined
by the claims of the patent. The claims define the "metes and bounds" of the inven-
tion and may be considered to be the definition of the property in a manner analogous
to the definition of property in a deed to land. Just as a landowner may have a cause
of action for trespass on the real property, a patentee may have a cause of action for
trespass, i.e., infringement upon the intellectual property claimed. See SMITE, PATENT
LAW 849 (rev. ed. 1964).
104 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964).
105 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1964).
106 C. M. Wright U.S. Patent System and the Judiciary, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
727, 728 (1965).
107 A defendant in a patent suit will generally seek to present prior art, urging that
the advance of the invention claimed is not new, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1964), or is ob-
vious to one of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains, 35 US.C. §
103 (1964), and thus is unpatentable. A large percentage of the patents are held to
be invalid in patent litigation on either of these two grounds, as well as for failure to
meet formal requirements.
Although the Patent Office conducts an examination of the application relative to
the prior art, the economics of litigation foreshadow the economics of prosecution in
the Patent Office. The Office, within the economic constraints imposed, is unable to
make a comprehensive search. Moreover, certain persuasive prior art may not be avail-
able to the Patent Office.
A suggestion for flexible interpretation of a patent in terms of whether the patentee
made a patentable contribution to the art is contained in the final report of Special
Committee to Study the Patent System, July 1966, published by the American Patent
Law Association, Washington, D.C.
10 8 C. A. Wright, The Federal Courts - a Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.AJ.
742 (1966).
10 See, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936); Aghnides v. Holden, 226
F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1955). Compare Nickerson v. Pep Boys, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D.
Del. 1965).
11o See, e.g., Aghnides v. Holden, supra note 109.
11 See, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
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presents his patent, which is statutorily endowed with the presump-
tion of validity." 2  The patentee then asserts that the defendant's
device is an infringement on the claimed subject matter in his pa-
tent;".3 this assertion is usually coupled with evidence which tends
to support the validity of the patent." 4  Thereafter, the defendant
customarily will assert any of the defenses of non-infringement:
absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability; invalidity
of the patent or any claim of the patent for failure to comply with
any of the conditions of patentability as set forth in sections 100 to
188 of the act;.". invalidity of the patent or any claim of the patent
for failure to comply with the requirements of sections 112 or 251
of the act;" 6 or for any other factor or act made a defense by section
282 of the act."17
Generally, the courts first consider the issue of the patent's valid-
ity and, if the patent is held valid, subsequently decide the issue of
whether defendant's allegedly infringing device in fact infringes
upon the claim of the now "valid" patent. However, where the
court determines that the patent is invalid under any of the con-
ditions previously outlined, the issue of infringement of the patent
by the defendant's device is rendered moot.
The courts in patent cases generally apply the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel to subsequent suits between the
same parties."' Where the parties are different, however, the courts
commonly adopt the general rule of mutuality."9 Thus, where a sec-
11235 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
113 "If accused matter falls dearly within the claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it." Graver Tank & MNffg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
607 (1950). Where the allegedly infringing device is not literally within the words
of the claim but falls within the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may also be made
out. Id. at 608-09. Applicant's remarks or amendments made to the claims during
prosecution before the Patent Office may serve to narrow the scope of the claims to
the extent that the allegedly infringing device is no longer covered. Exhibit Supply
Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Hughes Tool Co. v. Varel Mfg. Co.,
336 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Pigott, Equivalents in Reverse, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 291 (1966).
114 Inquiries into "such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia
of obviousness or non-obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy." Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
11535 U.S.C. § 100-88 (1964).
116 35 U.S.C. § 112, 251 (1964).
11735 U.S.C. 282 (1964).
118 Cf. Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1955). But see Nicker-
son v. Pep Boys, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965).
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ond suit is brought by the patentee whose claims have been previous-
ly adjudicated invalid, but against a different defendant, the validity
of the same claims may be relitigated. 2 ° This brings up the inter-
esting question as to why the patentee may be permitted to
relitigate his patent even when it has been previously held in-
valid.12
1
The Supreme Court of the United States in Triplett v. Lowell 22
considered the question of whether the patentees were barred from
maintaining a second suit, against different defendants, for infringe-
ment of the claims of the patent previously held invalid. The
petitioners urged that once any claim of the patent is adjudged
invalid, no further suit could be maintained upon the invalid claim
or upon any other daims 23 of the patent without disclaimer'24
of the claims previously held invalid. The Court rejected this argu-
ment and held:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an
adjudication adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes
another suit upon the same claims against a different defendant.
While the earlier decision may by comity be given great weight in
a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like de-
cree, it is not res adjudicata and may iot be pleaded as a de-
fense.125
The Court in discussing the disclaimer statute applicable at the
time suggested that it did not deny the patentee the right to bring a
second suit for infringement of a claim already held to be invalid. 2
[N]either the rules of the common law applicable to successive
litigations concerning the same subject matter, nor the disclaimer
statute, precludes re-litigation of the validty of a patent claim
previously held invalid in a suit against a different defendant' 27
Mr. Justice Stone went on to say that a court is not commanded by
12 Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936).
121 A patent secures a legal monopoly of the claimed subject matter to the patentee
in consideration for his disclosure of the invention to the public. An invalid claim,
therefore, may be a definition of intellectual property already in the public domain
where the invalidity is predicated on either § 102 or 103 of the act. On the question of
public policy preventing "recapture" of inventions once dedicated to the public, see
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1945).
122297 U.S. 638 (1936).
="Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is invalid the
remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid." 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1964).
124 See ibid.
125 297 U.S. at 642. Comity has been termed a rule of expediency, not a rule of
law. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900).
126 297 U.S. at 644.
127Ibid.
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the disclaimer statute to accept as conclusive a previous adjudication
of invalidity of the same claim. Instead he asserted:
The court whose jurisdiction is invoked by such a suit must
determine for itself validity and ownership of the claims asserted,
notwithstanding a prior adjudication of invalidity of some of them,
unless those issues have become res adjudicata, by reason of the
fact that both suits are between the same parties or their privies.
If it determines that the claims previously adjudicated are valid,
there is no occasion for disclaimer.128
In Triplett, it was further recognized that certiorari will not
generally be granted by the Supreme Court in patent cases unless
there is a conflict in the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals.'29
In Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 3' the
Supreme Court considered a conflict with respect to a particular
patent between the Seventh' and Third32 Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals, the former holding the patent not infringed and therefore
finding it unnecessary to pass on the question of its validity, and the
latter holding the patent valid and infringed.' The court arrived
at the following determination:
Where the questions presented by the contested claims of in-
fringement and validity are purely factual this Court ordinarily
accepts the concurrent conclusions of the district court and Circuit
Court of Appeals .... But in resolving conflicting views of two
Circuit Courts of Appeals as to a single patent, we are obliged to
undertake an independent reexamination of the factual questions.' 3 4
More recently, the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,135 con-
sidered patentability to be a question of fact when statutory issues of
obviousness of the claimed invention over the prior art are con-
cerned.'36 The application of the different facts or the prior art to
determine the ultimate question of patent validity, as required by the
statute, is one of law. 7 Thus, it appears that the comparison be-
tween the device of the patent, as claimed, and the prior art, as it is
12 81d. at 645.
129 Id. at 644.
130 322 U.S. 471 (1944).
131 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1943),
aff'd, 322 U.S. 471 (1944).
132 Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 78 F.2d 991 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 626 (1935).
133 322 U.S. at 472-73.
134 Id. at 473.
135383 U.S. 1 (1966).
13635 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
137 383 U.S. at 1.
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known, is a factual question which must be determined by the
tribunals, and the application of these facts to determine patenta-
bility is a question of law.
The Supreme Court in Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc.,"9
determined, within the general rule of Triplett,4 ' that a manufac-
turer who had assumed control of the defense in a patent suit
against his customer was bound as a privy by the principle of res
judicata in a subsequent suit by the patentee against the manu-
facturer.14' The Court applied the rationale of Lovejoy v. Mur-
ray,'42 holding that one who controls a defense in a suit is precluded
from relitigating the issues adjudicated in the first.
The questions of issues previously litigated and whether the
issues actually litigated are of law or fact continue to raise problems
for the courts. Although recent Supreme Court pronouncements on
the question of issues of law or fact would appear to settle this ques-
tion, 4 ' the broad spectrum of application of the rules of res judicata
and collateral estoppel has presumably not been clarified by these
holdings.'44 Employment of the rule that the issues previously
determined are conclusive on the parties should lead to decisions
that the issues refer only to the specific ground of invalidity pre-
viously considered. Since the failure to comply with any one of the
conditions of patentability set forth in the Patent Act may provide an
issue as to the validity of a patent, such a holding would appear to
warrant relitigation on any one of the several remaining grounds.
However, it is apparent, in the absence of error by the court, that
138 Ibid.
139 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
140 See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
141365 U.S. at 262. It might be interesting to note at this point that the Uniform
Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] covers a somewhat similar and analogous
situation. Under § 2-312 of the UCC, a seller, in the absence of agreement to the con-
trary, "who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind warrants that the goods
shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringe-
ment.... " UCC § 2-312(3). However, "a buyer who furnishes specifications to the
seller must hold the seller harmless" against any infringement claim. Ibid. A buyer
must notify the seller "within a reasonable time after he receives notice of the litigation
or be barred from any remedy over for liability established by the litigation." UCC
§ 2-607 (3) (b). If the seller is answerable to the buyer for a claim for infringement
under UCC § 2-312(3), he may demand in writing that the "buyer turn over to him
control of the litigation including settlement or else be barred from any remedy" against
the seller. UCC § 2-607 (5) (b). See also UCC § 2-607 (b).
14270 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1 (1865).
143 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
144 Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S.
302, 322 (1945) ("the factual issue of validity") (Emphasis added.); American Infra-
Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., 149 U.S.P.Q. 722, 729 n.4 (8th Cir. 1966).
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a claim, once held invalid, is truly invalid and that should be the
termination of any proprietary rights in the subject matter of the
claim. 5 The remedies available to the patentee to reassert the
validity of his claim, to test the validity of the judgment, or to in-
voke statutory remedies provide a substantial quantum of justice
with respect to his rights, as will hereinafter be discussed.
Although the 1952 Patent Act has been in effect for nearly fifteen
years, certain fundamental disagreements as to its interpretation con-
tinue to exist in the circuits.'46 Since basic differences on the ques-
don of patentability of a particular device in relation to the prior art
continue to persist, stability and consistency in the patent law might
never be achieved. The law is compounded where a patentee is per-
mitted to relitigate the claims of his patent in a different circuit.
Increased activity in providing res judicata and collateral estop-
pel effects to prior adjudication in patent litigation may well operate
to narrow interpretational differences between circuits in patent
matters.
IV. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
The courts have considered the effect of prior adjudication of a
patent from several viewpoints, namely: (1) the "traditional no-
tion" of res judicata which limits application of the doctrine to
cases in which the same parties or their privies are involved and
the same claims and alleged infringing device are in issue; (2) the
"presumption approach" which merely views prior adjudications as
strengthening or weakening the presumption of validity of a patent;
(3) the "follow unless" theory which suggests that prior adjudica-
tion, although not binding, should be followed unless the decision
discloses a very probable error in law or fact; and (4) the "broad
approach" to the doctrines, which has eliminated the mutuality re-
quirement.
These approaches display a continuous spectrum from narrow
or limited applications to very broad applications of the doctrines to
patent validity determinations.
'
4 5 The patentee's rights are protected by appeal and modification of judgment
as well as by the possibility of reissuing the patent with narrower, patentable claims.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (1964).
146 See, e.g., the variance between the circuits which prompted the Supreme Court
to consider Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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A. The Traditional Approach to Res Judicata in Subsequent
Validity Determinations
In Aghnides v. Goodrie, 47 the court of appeals held five claims
of the plaintiff's patent invalid in the suit for patent infringement. 48
Another suit had previously been filed (and was still pending) by the
plaintiff-patentee against different defendants 49 who, after a decision
was first reached in the Goodrie suit, moved for summary judgment
on the findings and conclusions of the prior Goodrie adjudication,
urging that, as a matter of law, 5' the defendants in the second litiga-
tion were entitled to judgment since no genuine issue of material fact
remained. "' The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the previously
filed suit was pending at the time of the first decision against alleged
infringers who were not shown to be identified with the defendants
in the first adjudication in any manner.'
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the rules of res judicata did
not apply, 5 ' and that the former decision was not the law of the
circuit to the extent that it is decisive in other cases for infringe-
ment against other defendants. Therefore, the appellate court re-
versed the summary judgment for the defendant, stating that the
plaintiff could relitigate his previously adjudicated claims even
though the evidence submitted at the trial did "not differ essentially
from the evidence submitted in the former case,"' 54 citing Triplett
v. Lowell. 55
The concurring opinion 50 reiterated that the patentee is entitled
to another day in court, without having to justify the second appear-
147210 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.), ceit. denied, 348 U.S. 826 (1954).
1481d. at 860, 863.
14 9 Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949 (7th Cit. 1955).
15 0 FED. . Cv. P. 56(c) relates in part: "The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
ISMAghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949, 950 (7th Cir. 1955).
152 Ibid. It should be noted that the defendants did not urge this position upon
the court, except by way of the motion, so the issue of whether res judicata applied
was not squarely met.
'
5 3 The plaintiff filed affidavits seeking to overcome the previous holding that a
prior art device anticipated the patent. On appeal, the court said that the affidavits were
"general and, in the ordinary case, would not constitute a sufficient showing of a genu-
ine issue as to any material fact." Ibid. The court merely concluded that the evidence
should be submitted at the trial.
154 Ibid.
'55 297 U.S. 638, 642-44 (1936). For a partial discussion of this case, see text
accompanying notes 122-29 supra.
1156Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 1955).
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ance by the plaintiff-patentee, 5 ' even though "this queer result"
is unavoidable under the existing law. 5 '
In Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding Specialists (Can.)
Ltd.,"5 9 the court considered an action for declaratory judgment of
invalidity of the defendant's patent; certain claims of the patent had
previously been held invalid in personam in a Georgia district
court.' The plaintiff relied on essentially the same prior art that
successfully invalidated the claims of the patent in the Georgia
court, although the accused devices were different.'' In accord
with the principle of comity, the court gave great weight to the prior
adjudication, but, as in Triplett, opposite conclusions on the issues of
both validity and infringement were reached in the second court, "on
the basis of the full record."' 62 Whenever the two records, the two
infringers, or the allegedly infringing devices are different, res judi-
cata may not be applicable.
The Eighth Circuit feels that the prior decisions of the appellate
tribunals are entitled to respect and "are not to be brushed aside
lightly," as evidenced by its decision in John Deere Co. v. Graham.
6 3
The patent had previously been held valid in the Fifth Circuit." '
A situation of limited applicability of res judicata in patent cases
is readily apparent where the defendant in the second case had been
a party or in privity with a party in the first litigation. In E. 1. duPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,16' the defendant moved
for summary judgment, 66 asserting that plaintiff's patent was
1 5 7 The opinion noted that a patent suit is not an in rem proceeding. Therefore,
selection of different defendants who allegedly infringed the patent permitted relitiga-
don. Ibid.
158 In Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 356 F.2d
442 (7th Cir. 1966), Aghnides was said to have "made dear" that a prior judgment
against different defendants was not res judicata. Id. at 446.
159 249 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1965).
160 Carding Specialists (Can.), Ltd. v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 234 F. Supp. 444
(M.D. Ga. 1964).
161The test of whether the allegedly infringing devices are the same or not bears
little weight when considering the issue of validity. Once having established validity,
it becomes necessary to ascertain whether the devices infringe upon the valid daims,
even in subsequent suits between the same parties.
'
6 2 Abington Textile Works v. Carding Spedalists (Can.), Ltd., 249 F. Supp. 823,
850 (D.D.C. 1965).
163 333 F.2d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 1964), af'd, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
16 4 Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 826 (1955); Graham v. Cockshutt Farm Equip., Inc., 256 F.2d 358 (5th Cit.
1958).
165 250 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
166 FED. R. CIrv. P. 56.
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invalid." The defendant successfully urged that prior litigation
between the same parties, 6 ' although involving a different issue
of patentability,'69 collaterally estopped the plaintiff from re-
litigating the same factual issues. Where the material facts under-
lying the motion for summary judgment are facts which have been
judicially determined with finality" ' between the same parties, col-
lateral estoppel applies,"7 and the motion for summary judgment
may be granted even where new affidavits are submitted. 7 2
Furthermore, it must be noted that one who openly controls the
defense in a suit in which he has an interest will be precluded from
relitigating the adjuducated issues of the first action in a subsequent
action. 3  Through the result of Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons,
Inc.,' 4 a manufacturer of an allegedly infringing device who agreed
to defend infringement actions against its customers would be bound
by the final judgment in any such suits,' 5 even if the manufacturer
did not subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
In Schnell, the petitioners argued that since the manufacturer of the
devices in suit openly defended and controlled the suit, personal
jurisdiction attached. The Supreme Court refused to accept this argu-
'
6 7 The defendant urged that the plaintiffs invention had been in public use and
on sale more than one year before the application was filed and was thus barred for
failure to meet the condition of patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964).
250 F. Supp. at 820-21.
10SUnion Carbide Corp. v. Traver Invs., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. IM. 1965).
169e prior adjudication involved the question of priority of invention. The
plaintiff's first application failed to disclose an operable process. A proper application
was not filed until some two years later. In the interim, a commercial public use had
been made of the invention and plaintiff was barred from obtaining a patent under
the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964). If the earlier-filed application had
been proper, the earlier filing date would have been maintained and a patent issued. 250
F. Supp. at 820. On the question of priority and intervening use, see, e.g., Hovid v.
Asari, 305 F.2d 747 (9th Cit. 1962); Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem.
Works, 177 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1949).
170 Failure to appeal either a prior judicial adjudication or a motion affecting
factual issues in the previous cases may operate to achieve the requisite degree of
judicial finality. See, e.g., Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc. v. Belt-Ice Corp., 316
F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 902 (1963); Walker v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 268 F.2d 16, 25-26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 903
(1959). The latter was cited in the duPont case.
'
7
'Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 19 (1865); Souffront v. La Com-
pagnie Des Sucreries De Porto Rico, 217 U.S. 475 (1910).
172 E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 250 F. Supp. 816, 819
(N.D. IIl. 1966).
173 Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 n.4 (1961).
'74365 U.S. 260 (1961).
1757he manufacturer had no place of business in the district. Therefore, venue
as to the manufacturer could not be had under the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 5 1400(b)
(1964). Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260 (1961).
176 Id. at 262. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916).
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ment because of the special nature of the patent venue statutes.177
Thus, it appears that under these special circumstances the effects
of res judicata may apply, even where the defendant is able to
exercise his rights under the complex patent venue statutes.
It is also clear that issues actually litigated between parties in a
first suit preclude relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent
suit17' The question often arises, however, as to those issues which
might have been litigated between parties. In Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,179 the Supreme Court held that the determi-
nation of validity of a patent in a prior suit is not res judicata in
a suit involving the question of patent misuse as a defense, even
though the defendant had previously provided the defense in the
original suit, 8° indicating that public interest was involved in
preventing an affirmative judicial indication on the question of
patent misuse.
An ancillary, yet related, subject should be noted in conjunction
with the "traditional approach" to res judicata - that of the effect
of state litigations. Determinations in state courts of matters tan-
gentially related to patent adjudication may be res judicata in subse-
quent suits between the same parties in a later infringement action
in the federal courts. This may arise, for example, where a state
action in contract determines that a device is not within the claims
of a patent which is the subject matter of a license. A state court
judgment to that effect may collaterally estop the federal court as
to the issue of whether that device infringes the claims of the pat-
ent. 
81
B. The Presumption Approach
A patent is presumed to be valid when issued, and the burden
of establishing invalidity rests on the party asserting it.' The pre-
sumption of validity is strengthened when the most pertinent
prior art is considered during the prosecution of the application in
the Patent Office'88 and weakened where the best art has been over-
177 365 U.S. at 262.
178 See text accompanying notes 13-36 supra.
179 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
180 Id. at 669-70.
181 See, e.g., Vanderveer v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957); Zemba v. Rodgers, 87 N.J. Super. 518, 210 A.2d
95 (Super. Ct. 1965). See also 11 VAND. L. REV. 240 (1957).
18235 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
183 See, e.g., L. S. Donaldson Co. v. La Maur, Inc., 299 F.2d 412, 420 (8th Cir.),
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looked by the Patent Office.' Many courts have taken the
position that the presumption of validity is strengthened by a
holding of validity in another court and weakened by a holding of
invalidity.
In Bowser, Inc. v. United States,"8 5 the Court of Claims espoused
the following approach:
The strength of the presumption [of validity] varies with the
substance of the assertion, e.g., if the asserting party relies on prior
art that previously has been considered either by the Patent Office
or another court then the presumption of validity is strong or if
the asserting party cites prior art that is more pertinent than that
considered by the Patent Office of another court then the pre-
sumption of validity is considerably weakened.'8 6
In Audio Devices, Inc. v. Armour Research Foundation,"7 the
judgment for the plaintiff in an action for a declaration of invali-
dity in the district court was affirmed for the reasons that the exam-
iner in the Patent Office had failed to consider, in the record, some
of the pertinent prior art and that the patent in suit had previously
been held invalid.' The court in Audio Devices was influenced,
in part, by its consideration that the presumption of validity was
"substantially weakened" by the reasons mentioned above.'
On the contrary, an Illinois district court, in Elgen Mfg. Corp. v.
Ventfabrics, Inc., 0 relied somewhat heavily on a prior adjudica-
tion of validity' 9' of certain claims of the patent in suit to sustain the
validity of the same patent in the second suit. The court considered
that the presumption of validity was entitled to greater weight where
the principal art urged by the defendant had been relied on in the
Patent Office or by the instant court in another suit.9"
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962); Freeman Mfg. Co. v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc.,
195 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Bowser, Inc. v. Richmond Eng'r Co., 166
F. Supp. 68, 75 (E.D. Va. 1958), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 264
F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1959).
184 See, e.g., Tilotson Mfg. Co. v. Textron, Inc., 337 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1964);
John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 1
(1966); Milton Mfg. Co. v. Potten-Weil Corp., 327 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1964).
185 148 U.S.P.Q. 155 (Ct Cl. 1955).
186 Id. at 157.
187 293 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1961).
188 Armoutr Research Foundation v. C. K. Williams & Co., 170 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.
Ill. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 811 (1961).
189 293 F.2d at 107.
190207 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. IM. 1962), af'4d, 314 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1963).
191 Id. at 250. The prior case is Elgen Mfg. Corp. v. Grant Wilson, Inc., 285 F.2d
476 (7th Cir. 1961).
192 207 F. Supp. at 250.
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Courts have also recognized the persuasive effect of judgments
rendered in foreign countries which have inter partes proceedings
relating to the grant of a patent. In general, while the foreign de-
cisions are not controlling, the decisions may be given evidentiary
weight in considering the domestic suit.'
Upon a consideration of the evidence in a second suit, the pre-
sumption of validity may be held to have "vanished,"194 illustrat-
ing the spectral erosion of the presumption to the point of its elimi-
nation.
C. The "Follow Unless" Theory
The "follow unless" theory for determining the consideration
which a second court will afford the decision of a first court in
patent cases provides that the prior suit, while not controlling,
should be followed unless the decision discloses a "very probable
error in law or fact."1 ' This approach provides a more liberal
application of the doctrine while affording the patentee the oppor-
tunity to sustain his patent despite the prior holding of invalidity.
In La Maur, Inc. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 98 the court con-
sidered a suit for infringement of a reissue patent where the original
patent was previously held invalid on grounds of obviousness in
view of the prior art.9 7 The court found that the facts established
in the former suit were also of record in the later litigation, " even
though the plaintiff asserted certain "new theories" and new facts
in an attempt to mitigate the adverse effect of the prior adjudication.
However, the evidence submitted was not considered to be of a
sufficient, new, credible, and factual nature so as to rebut the prior
decision.9" Accordingly, the court concluded:
198 See, e.g., American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 149 U.S.P.Q.
722, 729 (8th Cit. 1966); Ditto, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 336 F.2d 67,
70-71 (8th Cir. 1964); Dr. Beck & Co., G.LB. v. General Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp.
86, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Duncan, The European Patent Convention as a
Guide to Modernizing Our Patent Examination System, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SoCy 220,
236, 264 (1965).
194 Micek v. Radiator Specialty Co., 135 U.S.P.Q. 220 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd,
327 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1964).
195 Cold Metal Process Co. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 285 F.2d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel Corp.,
233 F.2d 828, 837 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956); Cincinnati Butch-
ers' Supply Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 230 Fed. 453, 454 (6th Cir. 1916).
196 148 U.S.P.Q. 59 (N.D. IIl. 1965).
197 L. S. Donaldson Co. v. La Maur, Inc., 299 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 815 (1962).
198 148 U.S.P.Q. at 66 (Finding of Fact No. 21).
199 Ibid.
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The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit hold-
ing the original... patent invalid should be followed in the ab-
sence of apparent error of law or fact... particularly where the
facts relied on by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have
been established here.200
Moreover, the court went even further and found that the
prior decision holding nine claims of the patent invalid was "per-
suasive of the invalidity of the remaining two claims . . . which
are broader than the claims which were held invalid." 2
1
D. The Broad Approach
It has been suggested that collateral estoppel be applied in pat-
ent cases more liberally than in the past in order to ease the dogged
calendars of the federal courts and to eliminate the sense of injustice
felt when a patentee relitigates a patent once held invalid in another
circuit or against different defendants. Considerations which urge
that a broader effect be given to the decisions in a prior suit are
necessarily confronted with the notions which require ignoring the
reasoning which abrogates the rule of mutuality. It is suggested,
however, that the policy which prompts disclosure to the public for
a period of years in exchange for a patent lends itself to the mitiga-
tion of mutuality in patent cases, while continuing to protect the
patentee's interests.
In Nickerson v. Pep Boys,"' the court was confronted with
the issue of whether collateral estoppel required an adjudication that
a patent is invalid where the same patent had been determined to be
invalid in another circuit ° in'a prior suit against different parties.
The court first distinguished the various authorities used by the Su-
preme Court in Triplett v. Lowell.2 4
The first authority upon which the Court had relied was Mast,
Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co.,2 5 involving the effect of a determi-
nation of validity of the patent in a prior suit. The Nickerson
2 0 0 Id. at 71.
2old. at 72. In American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 150 U.S.P.Q.
180 (N.D. IMI. 1966), the district court considered a finding of validity by the court
of appeals for the district to be binding in the absence of persuasive new evidence of
invalidity, despite the differences in the parties. Id. at 182.
202247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965).
2 0 3 Nickersoa v. Bearfoot Sale Co., 311 F.2d 858 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 815 (1963).
204 297 U.S. 638 (1936). See also text accompanying notes 122-29 supra.
205 177 U.S. 485 (1900).
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court deemed it "obviously... inequitable to have the defendant in
the second suit bound by the validity adjudication in the earlier suit,
when he had no opportunity to be heard on the question."2 '
The court specifically pointed out that the patentee in the case at
bar had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue of validity and had
suffered an adverse verdict.
The second authority upon which Triplett rested, Sanitary Re-
frigerator Co. v. Winters,"' was distinguished by the court in Nick-
erson on procedural grounds. The adjudication of infringement
in the first suit was not in issue in the second suit, even though res
judicata would have applied.0 8
Having so distinguished the bases for Triplett, the court then
considered the question of mutuality,0 9 asserting that "The mu-
tuality rule thus runs counter to the salutary public policy that there
be a definite end to litigation when a party has had a full, free and
untrammeled opportunity to present all facts pertinent to a contro-
versy and to be heard thereon."21
The court believed that the plaintiff would not be unfairly
treated by estopping his assertion of the patent previously held
invalid in that (1) the plaintiff had selected the prior defendant; (2)
the plaintiff had chosen the forum; (3) the prior adjudication had
not summarily disposed of the issue of patent validity; and (4) the
plaintiff had not suggested that he had additional evidence for trial.
Since the plaintiff-patentee's chief contention was that the prior
suit had been erroneously decided, it was determined that public
policy made it desirable to terminate further litigation on the valid-
ity of the patent. 11
The court was careful to point out, by way of dictum, that situa-
tions may exist in which concepts of justice to the patentee would
preclude the application of the estoppel by prior judgment, envison-
ing, for example, a plurality of suits, all holding a patent valid. In
a later suit, the patent is held to be invalid. The Nickerson court
predicted:
To hold that the last decision is a bar to the patentee suing other
infringers might be unjust, for the holding of invalidity, in view of
repeated prior decisions to the contrary, would at least suggest that
206 247 F. Supp. at 221. (Emphasis added.)
207280 U.S. 30 (1929).
208 247 F. Supp. at 222.
209 See text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
210 247 F. Supp. at 223.
211 Id. at 224.
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something was amiss with the decison which held the patent in-
valid.-2 12
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is observed that several approaches to the recurring problem
of the extent to which the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel should be applied to successive patent litigation are avail-
able to the courts; each theory purports to maintain justice to the
parties to the suit. Little problem appears to exist in the applica-
don of traditional strict notions of res judicata to patent prosecu-
tion and patent litigation." However, more difficulty is encoun-
tered when considering the application of collateral estoppel.
An increased propensity to estop a patentee from relitigating a
patent, or claims of a patent, which had previously been held in-
valid in a final determination by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion is desirable and in accord with the rationale and public policy
which prompts the existence of the doctrine.215 As further inroads
are made into the doctrine of mutuality by courts in non-patent
cases,"' it is expected that courts hearing patent cases may well
follow. It is submitted that the reasoning of Nickerson provides
the patentee with procedures to preclude unjust results. It is sug-
gested that a validity determination should not be binding on later
litigants since later defendants may uncover additional or better prior
art which is sufficient to render the patent invalid. Moreover, a
later litigant may, through increased diligence, discover informali-
ties in the record which the prior litigant failed to urge. Since this
may present different issues, it is submitted that a determination of
validity should not collaterally estop a later litigant.
A prior determination of invalidity ought to be binding on the
patentee, but only with the safeguards presented in Nickerson. A
subsequent defendant may assert the same art or same argument
which persuaded the prior court that the patent is invalid.
On the other hand, providing the patentee with the opportunity
to present new evidence in support of his patent, despite the prior
determination, is a sound means of effecting a balance between the
conflicting interests of the parties and of achieving a substantial
measure of justice to all concerned.
212 bid.
213 See text accompanying notes 51-99 supra.
214 See text accompanying notes 100-46 supra.
215 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
2 16 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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The sensitive area of balancing the policies of collateral estop-
pel against public policies inherent in the patent system may achieve
renewed significance in some future cases. The Supreme Court has
indicated a strong policy against monopolies generally, to the ex-
tent that broad rules considering that which appears in the public
domain have evolved. 1 For example, the public is free to copy
devices which are not reserved to the originator by a federal statutory
scheme of protection. 18 Moreover, the Supreme Court has set forth
the public policy inherent in the right of the public to art in the
public domain.219 Perhaps judicial evolution will result in an ex-
pansion in the number of instances of the application of estoppel.
Under this tack, a claim held invalid over the prior art may be con-
sidered to be public property and accordingly unenforceable against
subsequent defendants. Emerging principles of antitrust law may
at some time support the proposition that an attempt to enforce a
claim once held invalid is a violation of the antitrust law.
Judicial order in patent law may require increased attention to
the need for reconsideration of the effects to be given a prior ad-
judication. Existing approaches, in the main, are sound in their
attempt to do justice to the parties. But the stability of a nation-
ally administered patent law may well require new insight into the
nature of the ability of the patentee to enforce his property
right. Erosion of mutuality, in rem patent proceedings, and other
tests have merits and deficiencies. But in a period when the patent
system is under renewed scrutiny, a review of the trends may well
be desirable.
While the courts have been somewhat hesitant to apply the tra-
ditional notions of res judicata and collateral estoppel to patent
litigation, the benefits of the development of these doctrines should
be extended more fully to patent situations, either by well-rea-
soned judicial decisions, short of intrusion into proper legislative
domain, or by legislative fiat.
The recent approaches toward stabilization of the applicability
of res judicata in patent prosecution are to be admired in their
attempt to clarify issues surrounding res judicata. Precise formula-
tion of issues litigated is necessary to the proper application of the
doctrine. Patent litigation may well profit by the clearer approach
that ex parte prosecution has taken.
217 See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
2 18 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
219 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
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It is suggested that this approach or an equitable modification
of this approach retains reasonable standards of justice for each
litigating party while at the same time extending the develop-
ment of patent law in a manner responsive to sound judicial thought
in the realm of pre-existing non-patent law.
